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GREAT WESTERN SAV. & LOAN ASSN. [69 C.2d

[L. A. No. 28698.

In Bank.

Dec. 12, 1968.]

·RA YMOND E. CONNOR et aI., Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants
and Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN SAVINGS AND
I.JOAN ASSOCIArrION, Defendant, Cross-defendant and
Respondent; MEYER PRITKIN et ai., Defendants,
Cross-complainants and Appellants.
[L.A. No. 28699.

In Bank.

Dec. 12, 1968.]

JAMES L. BURGESS et aI., Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and
Appellants, v. GREAT WESTERN SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Cross-defendant and .
Respondent; MEYER PRITKIN et at, Defendants,
Cross-complainants and Appellants.
(Consoli"dated Appeals.)
[1] Nonsuit-Appeal-Consideration of Eviden~Rest on Review.-On appeal from a judgment of nonsuit in favor of
defendant, review must gh'e to plaintiff's evidence all the
value to which it is legally entitled, must recognize every
legitimate infel'ence that may be drawn from that evidence,
and must disregard conflicting evidence, and if there is evidence that would support a finding against defendant on any
of the grounds set forth hy plaintiff, re"ersal of the nonsuit
judgment is required.
[2] Joint Adventurers - Definition and Nature: Words and
Phrases-Joint Venture.-A joint venture exists when there
is an agreement between the parties under which they have a
cOmmunity of interest, that is, a joint interest, in a COllllllon
business undertaking, an undcrstanding as to the sharing of
profits and losses, and the right of joint control.
[3] Id. Relationship Under Agreements for Subjlivision,
Development and Improvement of Realty.-No joint venture
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Dismissal and Nonsuit, § 58; Am.Jur.2d,
A ppeal and Error, § 886.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Joint Ad\'euturers, § 2; Am.Jur., Joint Ad\'l'lIture1'S (rev ed § 2 et seq).
,:HcX. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonlmit, §81(2)(1l); [2] Joint Adventurers, §1; Words and Phrases;
[3] Joint Adventurers, §3(10); [4] Building and Loan Associations, § 3; [5, 8-13, 15, 16, 18, 19] Building and Loan Associatiolls, ~2,3; [0,7] Negligelu',', ~5; 114] Courts, §91; [17] Negligence, § 16(4).
-Reporter's Note: These ealles were previoulily entitled, "Conner v.
COllejo Valley DeveluplIl!'nt Co," 111111 "Bu/'gcHIi v. COllejo Valley DevelOIlmont Co."
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or joint enterprise existed between a tract developer and home
builder and a savings and loan lender furnishing the principal
financing for land acquisition, home construction and home
purchase, and there was no evidence of a community 01' joint
interest in the undertaking, where, although the evidence
established that the de,'eloper-builder and the lender combined
their property, skill and knowledge to carry out the development in which each shared control, anticipating substantial
profit and cooperating in development, the lender participated
as a buyer and seller of land and lender of funds, the
developer-builder participated as a builder and seller of homes,
neither was to share in the profits or losses that the other
might realize or suffer, although the profits of each were
dependent on the development's success, and neither bad an
interest in payments received by the other.
[4] Building and Loan AssoCiations-Members-Duty of Association to Shareholders.-A savings and loan lender furnishing
the principal financing to a tract developer and home builder
for land acquisition, home construction, and ultimate hOllle
purchase, with the right to extensive control of the enterprise,
whose financing took on ramifications beyond the usual moneylenders' domain by actiye participation in the hOllle construction enterprise, violated its duty of care to its shareholders to
exercise its powers of control to prevent defective home construction where it knew or should have known of the developer's
inexperience and dangerously thin capitalization, and thnt
damage from attempts to cut corners was a risk reasonably
to be foreseen, failed to make soil tests, examine foundation
plans, or recommend changes in pre-packaged plans and specifications, and made no attempt to discover or remedy gross
structural defects discoverable on reasonable inspection, but
relied on building inspectors with whom it had had no experience to enforce a building code of which it was ignorant.
[5a-5c] Id.-Liability-Negligence in Home Construction.-A sayings and loan association lender furnishing the principal
financing to a tract developer and home builder for land acquisition, home construction, and ultimate home purcl18se, with
t1l.e right to extensive control of the enterprise, was under a
duty to the buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable care t()
protect them from damages caused by major structural home
defects and to prevent thc sale of seriously defective homes to
them, and the fact that it was not in pri,-ity of contract· with
the home buyers except as a lender for home purchases, did
not absolve it of liability for its own negligence in creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to them where the lender's transac[5] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Building and Loan Associations, § 25; Am.
Jur.2d, Building and Loan Associutions, § 45.
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tions were intended to affect the home buyers significantly, the
lender could ressonably have foreseen the risk of harm to the
home buyers, it was certain that the home buyers suffered
injury, the injury suffered by the home buyers WI\S closely
connected with the lender's conduct, substantial moral blame
attached to the lendel"s conduct, and the admonitory policy of
the law of t~rts called for the imposition of liability on the
lender for its conduct.
Negligence-Elemente-Basis of Duty-Contract.-Privity of
eontract is not necessary to establish the existence of a duty
to exercise ordinary care not to injure another, but such duty
may arise out of a voluntarily assumed relationship if public
policy dictates the existence of such a duty.
Id, - Elements - Basis of Duty - Contract. - Whether a
defendnnt will be held liable to a third person not in privity is
a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are tbe extent to which the transaction
was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of hann
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the eloseness of tile connection between the defendant's conduct and the injuries suffered, th~ moral blame
attached to defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing
future harm.
Building and Loan Associatione-Liability.-The transactions
of a savings and lonn association lender furnishing the principal financing to a tract developer and home builder for land
aequisition, home construction, and ultimate home purchase,
were intended to affect the home buyers significantly where
the success of its transactions with the developer-builder
depended on their ability to induce the home buyers to purchase homes in the tract and to finance the purchases with its
funds, where its funding agreement was on condition of minimum prior commitments to buy homes, where it w&l'ehoused
land for the developer-builder on the understanding that the
land would be used for a residential subdivision, where advances from the construction loans were to be used by the
developer-build Ct· to exercise repurchase options providing
capital gain to the lender, and where the lender had the
developer-buihler channel home buyers to it for loans and receivetl a loan fee from the developer-builder in the process.
Id.-Liability-Negligence.-A savings and loan association
lender furnishing the principal financing to a tract developer
and home builder for land aequisition, home construction and
home purchase, could reasonably have foreseen the risk of
harm to home buyers where it knew or should have known the
developer-build~r had never developed a tract of similar
magnitude, and WIlS operating on a dangerously thin capitaliZlltioll creating a risk of corner cutting in construction,
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further enlarged by the additional pressures on the developerbuilder ensuing from onerous burdens as a borrower froll! the
savings and loan association lender.
[10] Id. - Liability - Negligence. - In consolidated home buyers'
damage actions against a savings and loan association lender
furnishing the principal. financing for land acquisition, home
construction and home purchase in the development of a tract,
for negligent home construction, it was certain that plaintiffs
suffered injury where counsel stipulated that each of the plaintiff homeowners, if called, would testify that their respectiye
homes sustained damage in varying degrees of the character
concerned in the action, and where sufficient evidence was pre·
sented to show by way of example the existence of damage to
the homes and therefore injury to plaintiffs.
[11] Id.-Liability-Negligence.-The injury suffered by home
buyers, plaintiffs in consolidated damage actions against a
savings and loan association lender furnishing the principal
financing for land acquisition, home construction and home
purchase in the development of a tract, for negligent home
construction was closely connected with defendant lcnder's
conduct where it appeared that the lender pot only financed the
development of the tract but controlled the course it would
take, and that had it exercised reasonable care in the exercise
of its control, it would have discovered that the pre-packaged
plans purchased by the developer-builder required correction
and would have withheld financing until the plans were corrected.
[12] Id. - Liability - Negligence. - Substantial moral blame
attached to the conduct of a savings and loan association
lender furnishing the principal financing to a tract developer
and home builder for land acquisition, home construction, And
home purchase, with the right to extensive control of the
enterprise, where the value of the security for the lenders
construction loans as well as the projected security for its longterm loans to home buyers depended on the soundness of construction, where the lender failed of its obligation to its own
shareholders when it failed to exercise reasonable care to preclude major structural defects in the homes whose construction it financed and controlled, and where it also failed of its
obligation to the home buyers to protect them agaim;t structural defects beyond their capacity to discover or remcdy.
[13] Id. - Liability - Negligence. - Rules tending to discou rage
misconduct are particularly appropriate when applied to an
established industry j and the admonitory policy of the law of
torts called for the imposition of liability to home buyers "II a
savings and loan association lender furnishing the pril\t'il'al
financing to a tract developer and home builder for laud H'"'lui.
sition, home construction, and nltimate home purchaae, wit.h
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the right to extensive control of the enterprise, for its conduct
where it voluntarily undertook business relationships with the
developer-builder to develop the tract and to develop a market
for the tract houses in which prospective buyers would be
directed to the lender for their financing, thus becoming an
active participant in a home construction enterprise in which
it had the right to exercise extensive control, and where it negligently failed to exercise its powers of control over the enterprise to prevent the construction of defective homes.
[14] Courts-Decisions-Duty to Follow Law.-In the absence of
actual or prospective legislative policy, a court is free to and
must resolve the case before it in terms of common law.
[15] Building and Loan Associations-Liability-Negligence.-A
rule imposing liability to home buyers on a savings and loan
association lender furnishing the principal financing to a tract
developer and home builder for land acquisition, home construction, and ultimate home purchase, with the right to
extensive control of the enterprise, for defective homc construction and resultant damage, should not operate prospectively only, lind considcrations of public policy do not prccludc
retroactive effect.
[16a., 16b] Id,-Lia.bility-Negligence.-Two separate acts of negligence may be the concUlTing proximate cause of an injury;
thus a savings and loan association lender furnishing thc
principal financing to a tract developer and home builder for
land acquisition, home conshllction, and ultimate home purchase, with the right to extensive control of the enterprise,
was not insulated from liability to home buyers for defecti,'c
home construction and resultant damage by any negligence of
the developer-builder in constructing the homes or of county
building inspectors in approving the construction, as superseding causes of the home buyers' injury, where the risk that the
developer-builder's negligence might occur was the primary
hazard giving rise to the lender's duty and where the negligence of the huilding inspectors, confined to inspection, could
not diminish or spirit away the lender's negligent failure to
perform its duty to exercise reasonable care to protect home
buyers from seriously defective construction whether caused
by defective plans, inspection, or hoth.
[17] Negligence - Proximate Cause - Foresight of Intervening
Cause.-Jf the realizable likelihood that a third person may
act in a particular nllmner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligcnt, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not
prevent the IIctor from bt'ing liable for harm caused thereby,
[18] Building and Loan Associations - Liability - Impairment of
Junior Lienors Security. - In a ('J'Oss-action by pledgees of
promissory notes secured by second deeds of trust on land in a
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tract development to hold a savings and loan lentler furnishing
the principal financing to the tract developer and home buildel'
liable for impairment of cross-complainants' security ('aused
by damage to homes resultant from defective construction, and
to impose liens on any recovery plaintiff home purchasers
might otherwise obtain in their action against the lender and
others, it was error to grant a nonsuit against cross-complainant where, by stipulation and pretrial order, the parties agreed
that the issue of the lender's liability should be determined
first and that thereafter the rights and liabilities of the other
parties among themselves should be determined, where the
question of cross-complainants' entitlement to liens on any recoveries plaintiff might obtain from the lender had therefore
not yet been litigated, and where in further proceedings, crosscomplainants might be able to establish some basis for sharing
in plaintiffs' recoveries.
[19] Id.-Liability-Negligence-To Whom Liable.-Neither a
·savings and loan association lender furuishing the principal
financing to a tract developer and home builder fOl' laud aCIluisition, home construction, and ultimate home purchase, with a
right to extensive control of the enterprise, nor pledgees of
promissory notes secured by second junior deeds of trust Oil
lands in the tract, were under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect the other from the builder's negligence ill
constructing defective homes where the foreseeability of harm
to the pledgees as the result of defective construction was
substantially less than in the case of home buyers, where the
lender's negligence was more closely connected with home
buyers' injuries than the pledgees, and where substantially less
moral blame attached to the lender's conduct with 1'espect to
the pledgees than attached to its conduct with respect to the
home purchasers; and the saving and loan association lender's
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the developerbuilder from constructing defective homes was limited to the
members of the public who bought those homes.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ventura County. Robert R. Willard, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Consolidated actions by homeowners for rescission and restitution or alternative damages for losses resulting from defective home construction. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part.·
Harris K. Lyle, Edward L. Lascher,Lyle & Di Giuseppe
and James Di Giuseppe for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and
Appellants.
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Overton, Lyman & Prince, Ernest E. Johnson, Phyllis M.
Hix, John McClure and Lynn O. Poulson for Defendants,
Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Thomas L. Fike, Thomas Schneider, Cherie A. Gaines, Mark
C. Peery, Fadem & Kanner, Jerrold D. Fadem, Ernest L.
Graves and Gideon Kanner as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants and Defendants,
Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Swerdlow, Glikbarg & Shimer, Irving A. Shimer, Michael
H. Shapiro and William D. Moore for Defendant, Crossdefendant and Respondent.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Herbert E. Wenig,
Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C_ Joseph, Deputy
Attorney General, Kaplan, Livingston, Goodwin, Berkowitz &
Selvin, Herman F. Selvin, Charles E. Jones, Landels, Ripley,
Gregory & Diamond, Edward D. IJandels, Morrison, Foerster,
Holloway, Clinton & Clark, Paul E. Homrighausen and Melvin
R. Goldman as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Crossdefendnnt and Respondent.

)

'l'RA YNOR, C. J.-These consolidated appeals are from a
judgment of nonsuit in favor of defendant Great Western
Savings and Loan Association in two actions consolidated for
trial.
Plaintiffs in each action purchased single-family homes in
a residential tract development known as Weathersfield,
located on tracts 1158, 1159, and 1160 in Ventura County.
Thereafter their homes suffered serious damage from cracking caused by ill-designed foundations that could not withstand the expansion and contraction of adobe soil. Plaintiffs
accordingly sought rescission or damages from the various
parties involved in the tract development.
Holders of promissory notes secured by second deeds of
trust on the homes filed cross-complaints, alleging that their
security had been impaired by the damage to the homes.
They sought to impose liens on any recovery plaintiffs might
obtain from other defendants.
There was abundant evidence that defendant Conejo Valley Development Company, which built and sold the homes,
Jwgligf'ntly constructed them without rf'gard to soil conditions prevalent at the site. Spf'cifically, it laid slab foundations on adobe soil without taking proper precautions
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recommended to it by soil engineers. When the adobe soil
expanded during rainstorms two years later, the foundations
cracked and their movement generated further damage.
In addition to seeking damages from Conejo, plaintiffs
sought to hold Great Western liable, either on the ground
that its participation in the tract development brought it into
a joint venture or a joint enterprise with Conejo, which
served to make it vicariously liable, or on the ground that it
breached an independent duty of care to plaintiffs.
A brief review of the negotiations leading to Great Western's role in the development of the 'Weathersfield tract is
essential to a clear perspective of the issues. [1] Since the
appeals are from a judgment of nonsuit, such a review must
give to plaintiffs' evidence all the value to which it is legally
entitled, must recognize every legitimate inference that may
be drawn from that evidence, and must disregard conflicting
evidence. (Raber v. Tumin (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 654, 656 [226
. P.2d 574J ; Blumberg v. M. & T., Inc. (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 226,
229 [209 P.2d 1J.) If there is evidence that would support a
recovery against Great Western on either of the grounds set
forth by plaintiffs, the judgment of nonsuit must be reversed.
The Weathersfield project originated in December 1958,
when Harris Goldberg, president of South Gate Development
Company, undertook negotiations to purchase for South Gate
547 acres of the McRea ranch, a parcel of approximately
1,600 acres of undeveloped real property in the Conejo Valley, which was then undergoing the beginnings of large-scalf!
development. Goldberg and Keith Brown together owned and
controlled South Gate Development Company. They planned
to develop the property with the goal of creating a community of approximately 2,000 homes.
Neither Goldberg nor Brown had any significant experience in large-scale construction of tract housing. Goldberg
had left the men's apparel business in 1955 to begin a career
in real estate. He subsequently established a number of companies that engaged principally in subdividing raw acreage.
In 1958 he undertook the construction of a 31-home development called Wa.verly Manor; when 15 or 20 homes had been
partially completed under the supervision of a South Gate
employee, he engaged Brown to supervise completion of the
job. This task was Brown's first experience with tract COllstruction, although he had been licensed as a general contractor in 1950 and had built approximately 50 single-family
dwellings on an individual custom basis before 1958.
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In January 1959 South Gate signed an agreement to purelJase 100 acres of the McRea ranch for $340,000 within 120
days, and a conditional sales agreement to purchase 447
adjoining acres for $2,500 per acre over a IO-year period.
Neither South Gate nor Goldberg had the financial resources
to perform these agreements, and in March Goldberg
approached Great 'Western for thc necessary funds to purchase the 100-acre parcel on which Weathersfield was to be
constructed.
Great Western processed between 8,000 and 9,000 loans
each year, amounting to more than $100,000,000, but had not
previously made loans in Ventura County. It expressed an
interest to Goldberg in developing a volume of new construction loan business and in providing long-term financing in
the form of first trust deeds to the buyers of the homes to be
built. By the end of April, the general outlines of an agreement with Goldberg had been dcveloped, and they were
recorded in the minutes of Great Western's Loan Committee.
During the ensuing four months the pa.rties and their lawyers worked out the details of a transaction whereby Great
Western would supply the funds neeessary to enable Goldberg to purchase the 100-acre parcel and construct homes
thereon. In return, Great Western was given the right to
make construction loans on the homes to be built and the
right of first refusal to make long-term loans to the buyers of
the homes. Before agreeing to provide money for the purehase of the land, Great Western also demanded and
reeeived a "gentleman's agreement" that it would have the
right of first refusal to make construction loans on tllC homes
to be built on the adjoining 447-acre parceP
Great Western emploYf'd a geologist to determine whethf'r
an adequate quantity and quality of water would be available in the area. As a result of the geologist's report and its
own investigations, Great Western further demanded and
received a guarantee from South Gate, Goldberg, and Mr.
and Mrs. Brown that if Great
f'stern held title to the 100acre pareel in September 1960, adf'quate water service lines
from a new or existing public utility would be available at
tIl(' property linf' for consumer use.
Tn .July, Great Western provid!:'d the necessary funds for
tlll' purehllse of the Weathf'rsnf'ld tract. Goldberg l18d deposihl $HIO 000 of the *~40,000 pun'hase price with the escrow

'V

I Although Goldhcrg testified at the trial that he rejeeted Great West's dt'll1an<l for snch a right of first. Tefn":!l, his testimony was to the
('onl mry in a 106:; deposit.ioll that was also introduced.
('1"11
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agent on behalf of South Gate. He apparently obtained the
money by draining assets from his corporations, leaving a
combined net worth in those enterprises of $36,000 as of July
31.
Goldberg, by amended escrow instructions, substituted
Conejo Development Company in place of South Gate as purehaser of the land from the McReas, and all funds deposited
theretofore by South Gate were credited to Conejo. Conejo
had been incorporated several months earlier, though with
only $15,000 capital to handle the tract development.
Great Western deposited the remaining $150,000 of the
purchase price in a second escrow opened between Conejo as
seller and Great Western as buyer, took title to the land from
Conejo, and granted South Gate a one-year option to repurchase the land in three parcels for a total of $lBO,OOO. South
Gate, Goldberg, and Mr. and Mrs. Brown agreed to repurchase the property hom Great Western on demand for
$200,000 if the option \\'f're not exercised and adequate watcr
facilities were not available by September 1960.
The arrangement for the purchase of the land by Great
Western was an early example of what has come to be known
as "land warehousing." Under such an arrangement, a
financial institution holds land for a developer until he is
ready to use it. Unlike a normal bailee of personal property,
however, the institution retains title to the property as well
as the right to possession.
At the outset Great Western confronted the problem that
it could not lend Goldberg $150,000 outrigllt and still retain
the land as security, for section 7155 of the Financial Code
prohibited it from lending more than 331!:~ percent of the
appraised value of unimproved property.2 It therefore
sought to circumvent the specific statutory prohibition by
disguising what was in substance admittedly a loan as the
kind of investment in real property that was sanctioned by
seetion 6705 of the Financial Code.3
Great Western agreed to make the necessary construction
loans to Conejo only after assuring itself that the homes
2In 1961 the statute was amended to allow savings and loan associations to lend up to 70 percent of tIle appraised value of unimproved
property.
8In 1959 section 6705 read in part: "An association may invest in
real property and such investment may include subdividing and develop·
ing real property and building homes and other buildings on such prop·
erty principally for residentin I use by veterans on such property. An
association may own, rent, lease, m:lnagp, operntc for in('olllc, or sell such
property.' ,
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eould be successfully built and sold. During the negotiations
lin the terms of the contemplated construction loans to
COIH'jo and the long-tprm loans to bc offered to the buyers of
humps in the proposed developmcnt, Great Western investiglltpd Goldberg's financial condition and learned that it was
weak. Moreover, Great 'Vest ern received, without comment or
inquiry, an August 1959 financial statement from Conejo
that set forth capital of $325,000, of which $320,000 was
accounted for as estimated profits from the sales of homes
when the sales transactions, then in escrow, were completed.
Such an entry was far outside the bounds of generally
accepted accounting principles. The estimated profits, representing 64/65 of the total purported capital, were not only
hypothetical, but were hypothesized on the basis of houses
that had not yet been constructed.
Great Western delved no deeper into the proposed foundations of the houses than into the conjectural bases of
Conejo's capital. It did require Conejo to submit plans and
Npeeifications for the various models of homes to be built, cost
breakdowns, a list of proposed subcontractors and the type of
work each was to perform, and a sclledule of proposed prices.
Conejo, which at no time employed an architect, purchased
plans and specifications from a Mr_ L. C. Majors that he had
prcpared for other developments, and submitted them to
Oreat Western.
Great Western departed from its normal procedure of
reviewing and approving plans and specifications before making a commitment to provide construction funds. It did not
pXllmine the foundation plans and did not make any recommendations as to the design or construction of the houses. It
was preoccupied with selling prices and sales. It suggested
increases in Goldberg's proposed selling prices, which he
aecepted. It also refused any formal commitment of funds to
COJlcjo until a specified number of houses were pre-sold,
namely, sold before they were constructed.
Prospective buyers reserved lots after inspecting three
landscaped and furnished model homes standing on 1.6 acres
of the otherwise barren tract. The model homesites as well as
a 60-foot wide access road had been granted by the McReas
dirpctly to Conejo "without consideration and as all accommodation " two weeks before the close of the land-purchase
escrows.·
4The record does not disclose the source of the $111,000 supplied by
('ollcjo t.o builc1 nnd lanc1sr.apc the model homes. A permanent loan coverillll' the cost of construction was eventually received from Great Western.
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When Conejo sold the lots, its sales agents informed tIle
buyers that Great Western was willing to make long-term
loans secured by first trust deeds to approved per:,;ow" and
obtailll·d credit information for later submission to Great
Western. This procedure was dictated by the right of first
refusal that Conejo agreed to give Great 'Western to obtain
the construction loans. If an approved buyer wished to obtain
a long. term loan elsewhere, Great 'Vestern had 10 days to
meet the terms of the proposed financing; if it met the terms
and the loan was not placed with Great Western, Goldberg,
Brown, and South Gate were required to pay Great Western
the fees and interest obtained by the other lender in connec·
tion with' the loan. Most of the buyers of homes in the
Weathersfield tract applied to Great Western for loans. They
obtained approximately 80 percent of the purchase price in
the form of 24-year'loans from Great Western at 6.6 percent
interest secured by first trust deeds. Great Western charged
Conejo a 1 percent fee for loans made to qualified buyers,
and a 17'2 percent fee for loans made to Conejo on behalf of
buyers who, in Great Western's opinion, were poor risks.
By September, the specified number of houses had been
reserved by buyers, and Great Western accordingly made
approximately $3,000,000 in construction loans to Conejo.
Conejo agreed to pay Great Western a 5 percent construction
loan fee and 6.6 percent interest on the construction loans as
disbursed for six months and thereafter on the entire
amount. Great Western had originally demanded 6.6 percent
interest on the entire amount without regard to the disburse·
ment of the funds, and its 5 percent loan fee was higher than
normal because it asses8ed the loan as one involving a sub·
stantial risk. When the construction loaDS were recorded,
Conejo became entitled to advances on the loans and to
"land draws," lump sums calculated as a percentage of the
value of the land. Conejo received advances on the construe.
tion loans and land draws in the sum of $148,200. It turned
this sum together with $31,800 over to South Gate, which in
turn paid the total of $180,000 back to Great Western in the
exercise of its option to repurchase the loo-acre tract from
Great Western. South Gate simultaneously transferred the
land to Conejo.
Conejo accepted notes secured by second trust deed8 from
the buyers of homes for the balance of the purellase priee
that was not provided by Great Western. Goldberg planned
to discount the notes at 50 percent of their face value and to
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use the proceeds to pay the interest and fees to Great Western and provide a profit to Conejo. The evidence indicates,
however, that in his enthusiasm to develop the first 100 acres
of his projected community, Goldberg pared estimated profits
to the dangerously thin margin of $500 per house, and that
he exceeded his depth in expertise and finances, with a resulting deterioration in his financial position as construction
progressed. Conejo ultimately pledged the notes as security
for a $300,000 loan, 43 percent of their face value, forfeiting
profits in the urgent need for ·liquid capital. This loan was
obtained from cross-complainants Meyer Pritkin et a1. scven
business acquaintances of Goldberg who at his suggestion
organized a joint venture in December 1959 to purchase 382
acres of land in the Conejo Valley.
A subcontractor employed by Conejo began grading the
property before Great Western made a final commitment to
provide construction loan funds, and while Great Western
still nominally owned the land. During the course of construction, Great Western's inspectors visited the property
weekly to verify that the pre-packaged plans were being followed and that money was disbursed only for work compll,ted. Under the loan agreement, if construction work did
not conform to plans and specifications, Great Western had
the right to withllOld disbursement of funds until the work
was satisfactorily performed; failure to correct a nonconformity within 15 days constituted a default. Representatives of
Great Western remained in constant communication with the
developers of the Weathersfield tract until aU the houses
were completed and sold in mid-1960.
The evidence establishes without conflict that there was no
express agreement either written or oral creating a joint venture or joint enterprise rplationship between Great Western
and Conejo or Goldberg. Without exception the testimony of
t.he principal witnesses discloses specific disclaimers of all
intention that any such relationship should exist, and the
written documents provided only for typical option and purchase agreements and loan and security transactions. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the evidence of the conduct of the
parties demonstrates that neither the documents nor the testimony as to the parties' intentions accurately reflect their
legal relationsllip. They assert that such cvidence of conduct
supports an inf('renee that a joint venture or joint enterprise
T(>latiollsliip (>xisted. (See ~iv. node, § ]621; Ulli1'e1·.~al Ral('.~
Corp. v. Califm'lIia l"'ess Mfg. Co. (]942) 20 Cal.2d 75], 7G4765 [128 P.2d 665] j Nelson v. Abraham (1947) 29. Cal.2d / __ _
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745, 749-750 [177 P.2d 931] ; Holtz v. United Plumbing d';
Heating Co. (1957) 49 Cal.2d 501, 506-507 [319 P.2d 617].)
[2] A joint venture exists when there is "an agreement
between the parties under which they have a commwlity of
interest, that is, a joint interest, in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the sharing of profits anu
losses, and a right of joint control." (Holtz v. United
Plumbing & Heating Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d 501, 506-507. See
also Nelson v. Abraham, supra, 29 Cal.2d 745, 749 j Spier v.
Lang (1935) 4 Ca1.2d 711, 716 [53 P.2d 138] ; Quinn v. Recreation Park Assn. (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 725, 728 [46 P.2d 144].)
[3] Although the evidence establishes that Great Western
and Conejo combined their property, skill, and knowledge to
carry out the tract development, that each shared in the control of the development, that each anticipated receiving substantial profits therefrom, and that they cooperated with each
other in the development, there is no evidence of a community or joint interest in the undertaking. Great Western participated as a buyer and seller of land and lender of funds,
and Conejo participated as a builder and seller of homes.
Although the profits of each were dependent on the oyerall
success of the development, neither was to share in the profits
or the losses that the other might realize or suffer. Although
each received substantial payments as seller, lender, or borrower, neither had an interest in the payments received by
the other.1I Under these circumstances, no joint venture
existed. (See Wallace v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1930) 105
Cal.App. 664, 667 [288 P. 834]; Martin v. Ajax Constr. Co.
(1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 425, 433 [269 P.2d 132]; Enos v.
Picacho Gold Min. Co. (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 765, 770-772
[133 P.2d 663]; United Farmers Assn. v. Sakiota (1935) 7
Cal.App.2d 559, 560 [46 P.2d 770] j Sedia v. Elkins (1962)
201 Cal.App.2d 440, 451 [20 Cal.Rptr. 278]; Nichols, Joint
Venturers (1950) 36 Va.L.Rev. 425, 438-439. Cf. Martter v.
Byers (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 375, 384 [171 P.2d 101] ; Lasry
v. Lederman (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 480, 486 [305 P.2d 663] ;
Stilwell v. Trutanich (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 614, 620 [3 Cal.
Rptr.285].)·
IIWe need not consider plaintiffs' contention that some of the testimony
of Judge Alfred Gitelson, Goldberg's former counsel in real property
matters, was improperly struck from the record; consideration of the
testimony would not alter the conclusion that there is no evidence of n
community or joint interest in the undcrtaking.
UFoI' the same reasons, the evidence is insufficient to support an inference that there was a joint enterprise. The term" joint enterprise" is
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[4] Even though Great Western is not vicariously liable
as a joint venturer for the negligence of Conejo, there remains the question of its liability for its own lIegligence.
Great Western voluntarily undertook business relationships with South Gate and Conejo to develop the Weathersfield tract and to develop a market for the tract houses in
which prospective buyers would be directed to Great Western
for their financing. In undertaking these relationships, Great
Western became much more than a lender content to lend
money at interest on the security of real property. It became
an active participant ill a home construction enterprise. It
had the right to exercise extensive control of the enterprise.
Its financing, which made the enterprise possible, took on
ramifications beyond the domain of the usual money lender.
It received not only interest on its construction loans, but
also substantial fees for making them, a 20 percent capital
gain for "warehousing" the land, and protection from loss
of profits in the event individual home buyers sought permanent financing elsewhere.
Since the value of the security for the construction loans
and thereafter the security for the' permanent financing loans
depended on the construction of s6und homes, Great Western
was clearly under a duty of care to its shareholders to exercise its powers of control over the enterprise to prevent the
construction of defective homes. Judged by the standards
governing nonsuits, it negligently failed to discharge that
duty. It knew or should have known that the developers were
inexperienced, undercapitalized, and operating on a dangerously thin capitalization. It therefore knew or should have
known that damage from attempts to cut corners in construction was a risk reasonably to be foreseen. (See Lefcoe &
Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers (1966) 75
Yale L .•T. 127], ]293.)7 It knew or should have known of the
sometimes used interchangeably with" joint venture" and sometimes to
describe a nonprofit undertaking for the mutual benefit or pleasure of
tile parties. (See Shook v. Beals (1950) 96 CaI.App.2d 963, 967-968 [217
P.2d 56, 18 A.L.R.2d 9]9]; 2 Williston, Contracts (3d cd. 1959) § 318,
pp. 554-555.) When used to dcscribe a business or eommereial undertaking, however, California decisions draw no significant distinctions
between joint ventures and joint enterprises. (See, e.g., ]Joyd v. White
(1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 641, 657 [276 P.2d 92]; Larson v. Lewis-Simas·
Jones Co. (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 83, 89 [84 P.2d 296]; Ambrose v.
Alioto (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 362, 366 [150 P.2d 502].)
7For example, Goldberg refuscd to follow the suggestion of soil engineers that Conejo comply with FHA grading standards requiring all
llOmes to drain to the street, because the cost would be an extra $200
per lot.
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expansive soil problem,s and yet it failed to require soil tests,
to examine foundation plans, to recommend changes in the
pre-packaged plans and specifications, or to recommend
.changes in the foundations during construction. It made no
attempt to discover gross structural defects that it could haw
discovered by reasona.ble inspection and that it would have
required Conejo to remedy. It relied for protection solel~'
upon building inspectors with whom it had had no experience
to enforce a building code with the provisions of which it was
ignorant. The crucial question remains whether Great Western also owed a duty to the home buyers in the Weathersfield
tract and was therefore also negligent toward them.
[5&] The fact that Great Western was not in privity of
contract with any of the plaintiffs except as a lender does not
absolve it of liability for its own negligence in creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to tIl em. [6] "Privity of contract is not necessary to establish the existence of a duty to
exercise ordinary care .not to injure another, but such duty
may arise out of a voluntarily assumed relationship if public policy dictates the ¢xistence of such a duty." (Merrill v.
Buck (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 552, 561-562 [25 Cal.Rptr. 456, 375
P.2d 304]. See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647,
650 [320 P,2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358] ; Lucas v. Hamm (1961)
56 Cal.2d 583, 588 [15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685] ; Stewart
v. Cox (1961) 55 Cal.2d 857, 863 [13 CalRptr. 521, 362 P.2d
345].) [7] The basic tests for determining the existence of
such a duty are clearly set forth in Biakanja v. Irving,
.8upra, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, as follows: "The determination
whether in a specific ease the defendant will be held liable to
a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are
[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of prevcnting future
harm."
SAdobe soil is common in southern California. Tests conducted by
Conejo's soil engineers indicated the presence of adobe soil. Such soil is
distinguished easily by the naked eye in dry weather in areas where the
ground cover is sparse; when it dries and contracts, the surface crael{s
into plates, frequently hexagonal in shape and 10 or 12 inches in diameter. Several Conejo employees noticed the cbaracteristic cracks during
the summer of 1959, as did the geologist hired by Great Western to
investigate water supply problems.
•
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[5b] In the light of the foregoing tests Great Western
was clearly under a duty to the buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable eare to protect them from damages caused by
major structural defects.
[8] [1] Great Western's transactions were intended to
affect the plaintiffs significantly.
The success of Great Western's transactions with South
Gate and Conejo depended entirely upon the ability of the
parties to iuduce plaintiffs to buy homes in the Weathersfield
tract and to finance the purchases with funds supplied by
Great Western. Great Western's agreement to supply' funds
to Conejo to build homes in return for a 5 percent construction loan fee and 6.6 percent interest, was on condition that a
sufficient number of persons first made commitments to buy
homes. Great Western agreed to warellOuse land for Conejo
on tIle understanding that the land would be used for a
residential subdivision. Great 'Vestern also stipulated that
advances from its construction loans would be used by
Conejo to exercise repurchase options, thereby affording
Great Western the opportunity for a $30,000 capital gain.
Finally, Great Western took steps to have Conejo channel
buyers of homes to its doors for loans, extracting a 1 percent
loan fee from Conejo in the process.
[9] [2] Great Western could reasonably have foreseen
the risk of harm to plaintiffs.
Great 'Vestern knew or SllOUld have known that neither
Goldberg nor Brown had ever developed a tract of similar
magnitude. Great Western knew or should have known that
Conejo was operating on a dangerously thin capitalization,
creating a readily foreseeable risk that it would be driven to
cutting corners in construction. That risk was enlarged still
further by the additional pressures on Conejo ensuing from
its onerous burdens as a borrower from Great Western.
[10] [3] It is certain that plaintiffs suffered injury.
Counsel stipulated that eaell of tllC plaintiff homeowners, if
called, would testify that their respect.ive homes sust.ained
damage in varying degrees "of the cllaracter of which we
have been concerned in this action." Sufficient evidence was
presented to show by way of example the existence of damage
to the homes and therefore injury to plaintiffs. Under the
terms of t.he pretrial order, the extent of each plaintiff's
injury is to be litigated in further proceedings after the question of Great Western's liabilit.y is determined.
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[11] [4] The injury suffered by plaintiffs was clDsely CDnnected with Great Western's conduct.
Great 'Vestern nDt .only financed the develDpment .of the
Weathersfield tract but cDntrolled the CDurse it wDuld take.
Had it exercised reasonable care in the exercise .of its control,
it wDuld have discDvered that the pre-packaged plans purchased by ConejD required cDrrectiDn and would have withheld financing until the plans were cDrrected. s
[12] [5] Substantial moral blame attaches to Great Western's CDnduct.
The value .of the security for Great 'Vestern's constructiDn
IDans as well as the prDjected security fDr its IDng-term loans
to plantiffs depended on the soundness .of construction. Great
Western failed of its obligation to its own shareholders whell
it failed to exercise reasonable care to preclude majDr at l"Uetural defects in the hDmes whDse constructiDn it financed and
contrDlled. It alsD failed of its obligation to the buyers, tllC
mDre so because it was well aware that the usual buyer of a
home is ill-equipped with experience or financial means to
discern such structural defects. (Cf. Schipper v. Levitt &Sons, Inc. (1965) 44 N.J. 70 [207 A.2d 314, 325-326].) Moreover a hDme is nDt .only a majDr investment fDr the usual
buyer but also the .only shelter he has. Hence it beCDmes
doubly impDrtant to prDtect him against structural defects
that could prove beyond his capacity tD remedy.
[13] [6] The admDnitory pDlicy of the law .of torts calls
for the impDsition of liability .on Great Western fDr its CDnduct in this case. Rules that tend to discourage miscDnduct
are particularly appropriate when applied tD an established
industry.
[5c] By all the fDregDing tests, Great Western had a duty
to exercise reasDnable care tD prevent the cDnstruction and
sale .of seriDusly defective hDmes to plaintiffs. The CDuntervailing cDnsiderations invDked by Great Western and amici curiae
are that the impDsitiDn .of the duty in question upon a lender
will increase hDusing cDSts, drive marginal builders .out .of
business, and decrease tDtal hDusing at a time .of great need.
These are cDnjectural claims. In any eYent, there is no endurSThe vice-president in charge of Great Western's tract loan development aetivities testified that had Great Western known of the soil condition it would have required soil tests and the correction of plans he fore
approving a construction 101m. Alt.hough Cone.io h:\(l the right to seele
nnotller lender at any time to continue as finaneier of the projec·t, t.het·o
is no reason to assume that such lender would not have exercised rl'USOIlable care and imposed similar requhcmeuts.
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ing social utility in fostering the construction of seriously
defective homes. If reliable construction is the norm, the
recognition of a duty on the part of tract financiers to home
buyers should not materially increase the cost of housing or
drive small builders out of business. to If existing sanctions
are inadequate, imposition of a duty at the point of effective
financial control of tract building will insure responsible
building practices.l1 Moreover, in either event the losses of
family savings invested in seriously defective homes would be
devastating cconomic blows if no redress were available.
Defendants contend, however, that the question of their liability is one of policy, and hence should be resolved only by
the J~egislature after a marshalling of. relevant economic and
flocial data. There is no assurance, however, that the Legislature will undertake such a task, even though tract financing
grows apace, [14] In the absence of actual or prospective
legislative policy, the court is free to resolve the case before it,
and indeed must resolve it in terms of common law.
[15] Great Western contends that lending institutions
have relied on an assumption of nonliability and hence that a
rulc imposing liability should operate prospectively only. In
the past, judicial decisions have been limited to prospective
operation when they overruled earlier decisions upon which
parties had reasonably relied and when considerations of fair)less and public policy precluded retroactive effect. (Forster
Shipbuilding Co. v. Oounty of Los Angeles (1960) 54 Cal.2d
450, 458-459 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736].) Conceivably
lOIn 1965 a state legislative committee found that hundreds of homes
built upon expansive Boil in California had cracked to such an extent as
to make continued habitation uncomfortable or unsafe, that the existence
of such soil could be casily and chcaply identified, that the cost of engineering solutions wall miuimal and casily financcd by the builder and
1I0mcbuyer, and that "local ordinances requiring soil analysis prior to
lIome construction are virtually nonexistent," leaving the potential homelJUyer "without minimium allSul'ance thnt his purchase will be a safe
IIlId habitablc home." (6 Assembly Interim Com_ Report No. 21, Municipal and County Government (1965) p. 9, "Problems of Construction
Upon Expansive Soil. ") In 1965 soil analysis and precautionary measures were required by state statute. (Health & Sat. Code, 1117953,
17954.)

lIThe residential construction industry is composed principally of
small builders, most of whom have so little equity that they must borrow
money in order to finance the production of new homes. (See Gillies and
1Ifittelbaell, Managl'ment in the Light Construction Industry (1962)
I'p. 1;)·16, 19, 2]; Gillies & Curtis, Illstitutiollfil Residential Mortgage
Lending in Los Angeles County (1956) pp. 41·42.) Savings and lonn
nsso(,iatiolls lire bound hy markt·t fOl'rcs anti legal restraints to be a major
.mpJllil'r of funds to MilCh slDall hui hlers. (I.efcue and ])uuHon, 8'Itp"U,
';5 Yale L.J. 1271, 1284·1286.)
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such a limitation migbt also be justified when tllere appeared
to be a general consensus that there would be no extension of
liability. Such is not the case here. At least since MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N.Y. 382 [111 N.E. 1050,
L.R.A. 1916F 696], there has been a steady expansion of
liability for harm caused by the failure of defendants to exercise reasonable care to protect others from reasonably foreseeable risks. (See generally Prosser, The Law of Torts (3d ed.
1964) ch. 19.) By the time of the decision in Sabella Y. Wisler
(1963) 59 Ca1.2d 21 [27 Cal.Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889], such
liability had been imposed on a builder who negligently constructed a seriously defective home. (See also Stewart v. Cox,
supra, 55 Cal.2d 857.) Those in the business of financing tract
builders could therefore reasonably foresee the possibility that
they might be under It duty to exercise their power over tract
developments to protE'ct home buyers from seriously defective
construction. Moreover. since the value of their own security
depends on the constrndion of sound homes, they have always
been under a duty to their shareholders to exercise reasonable
care to prevent the construction of defective llOmes. Given
that traditional duty of care, a lending institution should
have been farsighted enough to make such provisions for
potential liability as would enable it to withstand the effects
of a decision of normal retrospective effect.
[16&] Great Western contends finally that the negligence
of Conejo in constructing the homes and the negligence of tIle
county building inspectors in approving the construction were
superseding causes that insulate it from liability. Conejo's
negligence could not be a superseding cause, for th~ risk that
it might occur was the primary hazard that gave rise to Great
Western's duty. [17] ", If the realizable likelihood that a
third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or
one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an
act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or
criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm
caused thereby,''' (Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Ca1.2d
772, 777 [285 P.2d 269], quoting Rest. Torts, § 449; see also
Rest.2d Torts, § 449; Weaver v. Bank of America (1963)
59 Ca1.2d 428, 433-434 [30 Cal.Rptr. 4, 380 P.2d 644].)
[16b] The negligence of the building inspectors, confined as it
. was to inspection, could not serve to diminish, let alone spirit
away, the negligence of the lender. Great Western's duty to
plaintiffs was to exercisc reasonable care to protect them from
seriously defective construction whether caused by defective
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plans, defective inspection, or both, and its argument that
thcre was a superseding cause of the harm "is answered by the
srttlrd rule that two separate nets of negligence may be the
t'Olwmring proximate causes of an injury. (Fennessey v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 141, 145 [124 P.2d 51] ;
Lacy v. Pacific Gas ((; Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 97, 98 [29 P.2d
78]]; . . . )" (Merrill v. Buck, supra, 58 Cal.~d 552, 563.)
[18] The question remains whether granting a nonsuit in
favor of Great Western against cross-complainants" was also
erroneous. As pledgees of promissory notes secured by second
deeds of trust, cross-complainants seek to hold Great Western
liable for the impairment to their security caused by the damnge to the homes and to impose liens on any recovery plaintiffs may obtain from Great Western or other defendants. By
stipulation and pretrial order the parties agreed that the issue
of Grcat Western's liability should be determined first and
that thereafter the rights and liabilities of the other parties
am01lg themselves should be determined. The question whether
cross-complainants are entitled to liens on any recoveries
plaintiffs may obtain from Great Western has therefore not
yet been litigated. (Cf. American 8av. & Loan Assn. v. Leeds
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 611 [68 Cal.Rptr. 453, 440 P.2d 933].)
Accordingly, it was error to grant a nonsuit against crosscomplainants as well as against plaintiffs, for in further proceedings cross-complainants may be able to establish some
basis for sharing in plaintiffs' recoveries.
[19] For the purposes of such proceedings, however, we
also hold that Great Western owed no independent duty of
(~are to cross-complainants. The balance of the factors set
forth in the Biakanja case is significantly different when an
investor in or pledgee of notes secured by second deeds of
trust is substituted for a member of the home-buying public as
tll!' party claiming a duty of care on the part of the tract
financier. Although some factors may indicate no difference
between plaintiffs and cross-complainants insofar as Great
Western's duties are concerned, others point toward a duty to
plaintiffs but not toward a duty to cross-complainants.
'fhe foreseeability of harm to cross-complainants as a result
of defective construction was substantially less than in the
case of plaintiffs. As security cross-complainants had notes
from the home owners as well as second deeds of trust. Furthermore, they assured themselves of a substantial margin of
safety against the risk that the notes would not be paid or
that the homes would be worth less than the purchase price
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when they lent only 43 percent of the face value of the notes.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, were powerless to protect their
equities in their homes from reduction or extinction by diminution of the value of the property as a result of defective
construction.
Likewise, Great Western's negligence was more closely connected with plaintiffs' injuries than cross-complainants'
injuries. Plaintiffs were injured by the diminution of value of
their homes as a result of defective construction. Crosscomplainants will be injured only if plaintiffs default on their
notes and the diminution in value of the homes leaves insufficient security to protect the second trust deeds.
Finally, substantially less moral blame attached to Great
Western's conduct with respect to cross-complainants than
attached to its conduct with respect to plaintiffs. The roles
played by cross-complainants and plaintiffs in the transaction
were crucially different. Like Great \Vestern itself, crosscomplainants were investors in a business enterprise and dealt
with Conejo as creditors, not as purchasers of the homes it
built. As substantial creditors of Conejo, cross-complainants
were voluntary co-participants with Great \Vestern and
Conejo in the enterprise of building and selling homes tll the
general public. Cross-complainants did not have Great Western's power to prevent defective construction through control
of construction loan payments; but, unlike plaintiffs, who had
no practical alternative to accepting Conejo's qualifications
and responsibility on faith, cross-complainants as substantial
investors were in a position to protect themselves. 12 Under
these circumstances, we do not believe that either Great
Western or cross-complainants were under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect the other from negligence on the
part of Conejo. Accordingly, Great Western's duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent Conejo from constructing
defective homes was limited to the members of the public who
bought those homes.
The parties stipulated that the homes of plaintiffs Elwood
and Evelyn Guest and plaintiffs John and Grace \Vhitaker
12Goldberg's accountant is one of four cross-complainants who are
co-partners doing business as Pritkin-Finkel Investment Company. He
testified that the partnership made investments on the advice of account·
ing elients without previous investigation, that it had made approximately
a dozen investments in the last several years totalling less than a millioll
dollars, and that. tile deals in which it had invested involved total dollar
amounts of approximately one hundred million dollars. Goldberg's former
counsel in real property matters is one of two cross· complainants who are
co-partners doing business as K. G. & Company.
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are not located in tract 1158, 1159, or 1160. As to them, the
nonsuit is affirmed. In all other respects the judgment is
reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

)

MOSK, J.-I dissent.
The evidence is overwhelming, and the majority concede,
that as between the lender of funds and the tract developer
tllere was no agency, no joint venture, no joint enterprise. It
is clear there was merely a lender-borrower relationship. Nevertheless, the majority here hold the lender of funds vicariously liable to third parties for the negligence of the
borrower. This result is (a) unsupported by statute or precedent; (b) incons.istent with accepted principles of tort law;
(c) likely to be productive of untoward social consequences.
At the threshold, it would be helpful to review some elem~ntary economic factors and relationships that appear to be
involved in this proceeding.
'l'he function of the entrepreneur in a free market is to
discern what goods or services are in apparent demand and to
gather and arrange the factors of production in order to supply to the. consumcr, at a profit, the goods and services
desired. III so doing, the entrepreneur undertakes a number of
risks. 'l'he demand may be less than he calculated; the .costs of
production may be greater. Hc is not only in danger of losing
llis own capital investment but he incurs obligations. to the
suppliers of land, materials, labor and capital, and he stands
liable under now-accepted principles of law for harm and loss
caused by defects in his products to those persons injured
thereby.
'fhe entrepreneur undertakes these calculated risks in the
hope of an ultimate substantial monetary reward resulting
from the return over and above his costs, which include not
only land, materials and labor but the- charges incurred in
obtaining capital. Indeed, "profit" has been commonly
understood to be the return above expcnses to innovators or
l'ntrepreneurs as the rcward for their innovation and enterprise. (People ex reI. Farnum v. San Francisco Sav. Union
(1887) 72 Cal. 199, 202-203 [13 P. 498].) The upper limit of
t lie entrepreneur's profit is determined by his success in the
market, and this results from his skill in assessing the demand
for his product and his minimizing losses through skillful
production.

--I
!

---)
Dec. 1968] CONNOR v. GREAT WESTERN

SAV.

& LoAN AssN. 873

(69 C.2d 850; 73 Cal.Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 8091

Conejo Valley Development Company and a.~sociatccl
parties were entrepreneurs.
The role of the supplier of capital is entirely different. The
lender, as a supplier of capital, is to receive by contraet a
fixed return or priee for his investment. He owns no right to
participate in the profits of the enterprise no matter how
great they may be. On the other hand, he is insulated from
the risk of loss of capitnl and interest in return for making
his money available, other than the risk of nonpayment of tIle
contract obligations. Indeed, it is- elementary that the owner
of money lends it to an entrepreneur and receives only a fixed
return, rather than obtaining the gain from using the money
11imself as an entrepreneur, on the condition that he be
relieved of risk. The basic, underlying risk in mortgage lending is that the lender might not get back wllat is owed to him
in principal and interest.
It seems abundantly clear, both legally and logically, that if
the lender has no opportunity to share in the profits or gains
beyond the fixed return for his supplying of capital, i.e;, if he
has no chance of reaping the entrepreneur's reward and exercises no control over the entrepreneur's business, elementary
fairness requires that he should not be subjected to the entrcpreneur's risks.
Great Western Savings and Loan Association was a Zender,
a supplier of capital.
By imposing the entrepreneur's risks upon the supplier of
capital, even though the latter has bargained away the opportunity of participating in the entrepreneurial gain on his capital by lending it at a fixed fee, the majority have effected a
drastic restructuring of traditional economic relationships.
The results may reverberate throughout the economy of our
state, and may seriously affect the money and investment
market, the construction industry, and regulatory schemes of
financial institutions, all without the faintest hint in either
stautory or case authority that such a draconian result is
compelled.
In fact, all available autllOrity points to a contrary result.
"The obvious drawback of the negligencc solution [to this
problem] is the lack of legal precedent for imposing such a
duty upon the lending institution." Lender Liability /01'
Housing Defects (1968) 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 739, 758. As Justice
Carter wrote in Routh v. Quinn (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 488, 491
[127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215] ; "It is an elementary principle
that an indispensable factor to liability founded upon negli.
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gence is the existence of a duty of care owed by the alleged
wrongdoer to the person injured, or to a class of which he is a
member." And in Dahms v. General Elevator Co. (1932) 214
Cal. 733, 737 [7 P.2d 1013], it was also said to be "elementary, of course, that no tortious liability can be imposed on a
defendant eve1i though it was negligent, unless defendant
owed a duty of eare to plaintiff." (Italics added.) Without
such a duty, any injury is as to this defendant damnum
absque injuria. (2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1960)
'}'orts. § 4.) The remedy is, as it should be, against the negligent builder.
It has never been doubted that the imposition of a duty
implies significant control over the agency of harm. The issue
()f right of control goes to the very heart of the ascription of
tortious responsibility, particularly where the alleged negligf'nt conduct is asserted to be a failure to control the conduct
of an independent third party.
In the absence of a special relationship a party has no duty
to control the conduct of a third person, so as to prevent him
from causing harm to another. (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43
Cal.2d 60, 65 [271 P.2d 23] ; Puller v. Standard Stations, Inc.
(1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 687 [58 Cal.Rptr. 792].) No authority
holds that lender-borrower is the type of relationship contemplating the duty of control over the conduct of another so as
to prevent injury to third parties.
The J.<'inancial Code, which contains California statutory
rules governing the operations of institutional lenders, creates
no duty of care by those institutions to any parties other than
their shareholders and depositors, and, of course, to governmental regulatory agencies. Indeed, the majority point out
that "Great Western was clearly under a duty of care to its
shareholders to exereise its powers of control over the enterprise to prevent the construction of defective homes. Judged
by tl\{~ standards goyerning non suits. it negligently failed to
discharge that duty." (Italics added.) That duty, the only
(lut.', d('lill('ateo. in the majority opinion, was care to its share11Olders. Assuming arguendo that negligence to shareholders is
)"rfl!'ctrd in the evio.rnee, no cause of aetion by these plaintiffs
is stated for the obvious reason that they were not Great
'Vesterll shareholders, and thus no duty was owed to them. In
Gill v. Mission Sav. & Loan Assn. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 753
[46 Cal.Rptr. 456], the court held that a savings and loan
association owed no duty of care to holders of promissory
notes and subordinated trust deeds with respect to supervision
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and management of construction loan funds. There, as here, it
was not alleged or proved "that the defendant agreed with
anyone to manage or supervise distribution of the loaned
funds, assumed to do so, actually undertook such, or was
required by statutory law or regulation to so manage or
supervise. Nor is there any showing of a voluntarily assunlpd
relationship between defendant and plaintiffs from which such
an obligation might arise." (Pp. 756-757.)
The evidence is barren of indicia that the defendants maintained any element of control over the enterprise involved
here. The record establishes without conflict that Great \Vestern and Conejo had no mutual right to direct each 01h£'r's
activities. The fact that Great Western was required by law
(Fin. Code, § 7156) to limit its rate of disbursements to the
borrower cannot import a duty to the ultimate purchaser and
is not the equivalent of a right to control the progress of
development or to participate in the management of thp borrower's enterprise. By regUlating disbursements the lender
may to some extent affect the borrower, but this is far
removed from control over the borrower's business and from
an affirmative duty to prevent the borrower's negligence
toward third parties.
Actual control or an implied agreement to control construction is a factual question, decided against the plaintiffs here
by the trier of fact. Before the written loan contract between
the lender and the developer was signed and before the plans
were approved, the lender could have exercised "cont rol ' ,
over the building project only by insisting on changes in tlw
foundation plans as a condition of making the loan. In this
respect, the lender here is in no' different position than any
other lender and exercised no greater "control" over the
building project than any other lender who can. if he wis\lPs,
withhold funds if he believes the funds will be used in a
harmful manner.
Whether the lender should be under a duty to conduct an
independent investigation to discover defects in the plans is
an entirely different matter. The ma.jority conclude that this
duty should be imposed on the lender here because it lweI
control of the construction enterprise. Upon analysis, 110Wever, it is clear t.hat tl1is control was mythical; it. consisted
merely of the power to refuse to lend money for the projN·t.
In this respect all I£'nd('l's may be held to "control" til,>
projt'cts they timmct'. Therein lies the vice of the majO/'ity
opinion.
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As to the" eontrol" exercised by Great Western after construction began, the only right it had under the contract was
t{) withhold funds if the work did not conform to the plans.
The inspections conducted by it were performed for this purpose and to comply with the statutory requirements concerning disbursement of funds. Thus, if the foundation plans
appeared defective, thc lender had no right under the contract
to insist upon their revision.
Great Western's position, as indicated above, was no different from that of any other lender: it had no contractual or
statutory right w conduct the operations of the builderborrower. Even if it were to be established that Great Western
was negligent in its duty to its own shareholders by ('xtendiug
loans w a builder of dubious competence, this did not set in
motion the subsequent relationship of the builder to the third
parties, and thc builder's superseding n<>gligencc insulates
Great \V<>stcrn from liability for wllatever negligence resulted
from merely lending money. "If the accident would have llappened anyway, whether the defendant was negligent or not,
then his negligence was not a cause ill fact, and of coursc
cannot be the legal or responsible cause." (2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1960) Torts, § 284, p. 1484.)
In short, neither the identity of the lender nor the t<>rllls of
the loan had any effect whatever upon the builder's ultiml1te
negligence. The lending of money cannot be said to havc
created a possibility of harm to third parties. The produciug
institution, here the builder, created the risk, controlled the
agency of harm, and thus was the actor under a duty to
minimize the risk. The defects in home construction were not
eaused by the lending of mOlH'Y; thpy were an incident of thc
process of physical construction.
The majority assert tIle lender knew or should have known
the developers were inexperienced and undercapitalized and
that thrre wpre soil problrms. Assuming tl)is to be so. the
lendrr may }1/1Ve been remiss in its duty to its shareholders,
but that conduct is unrelated to the buildl'r's negligence in
('rrl1ting structural defects which rl'sulted in injury to plaintiffs. The dt'fpcts would hn,'c o('l·llI"1'Nl if thc loans wure made
by defendant, if tllPY werr not llIade by defendant, if they
wcre made by anothrr ll'nding institution, or if the builders
used their own rpsourees exelusivl'ly. No relationship, 11owI'vrr tenuons, can be establislic(l hrtwcen the loans and the
JIl'gligPllce of thc builder.
The plaintiffs also rely upon tllc I1ppt·nisals and inspeptions
by defendant. These, llOwever, were performed in compliance
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with law and were intended to be a means of verifying the
existence of the construction for which loans had been made,
and of determining the progress of construction in order to
regulate the disbursement rate. The appraisals and inspections were intended only for the benefit of defendant and
state regulatory authorities. They were never in fact communicated to outsiders, neither the general public nor the prospective homeowners. They were not used to encourage or
induce anyone to purchase homes, but were adapted solely as
tools of internal management. Plaintiffs 1Itrain logic in
attempting to convert these internal operations of the defendant into representations to them, negligent or otherwise.
A duty of care is imposed only upon parties creating a risk
of foreseeable harm. To find that an institutional lender,
merely by providing capital, creates a risk of foreseeable harm
in place of or in addition to the borrower who constructs or
sets the harmful agency in motion, is a novel concept of tort
law. By parity of reason, a finance company would, by lending money for the purchase of an automobile, be liable for
. injuries to third parties caused by the owner's negligent
operation of the vehicle.
The majority attempt to adapt the "balancing of various
factors" in Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650
[320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358], to the factual circumstances
here. That their reliance is clearly misplaced is demonstrated
by an analysis of the six tests of Biakanja to establish liability in the absence of privity:
1. The extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect pla·intif/. Defendant's conduct, including its appraisals,
cursory inspections, and the making of loans, was intended
for its own purposes exclusively, i.e. for the benefit of its
shareholders and depositors. No representations were made to
any prospective homeowner and there was no testimony whatever indicating any actual or prospective homeowners relied
on any representations. There can be no question that the
transaction was intended to affect the lender and the borrower, and was not for the benefit direct or indirect of plaintiffs.
2. Foreseeability 0/ harm. The issue under this phase of the
test is the foreseeability of harm resulting from the lender'~
actions as distinguished from the conduct of the builder. It is
scarcely foreseeable by the lender, as a result of simply providing funds for construction, that gross structural defects
would exist in the llOmrs ultimately constructed by the
builder, particularly in a situation in which construction was

)
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overseen and approved by the governmental agencies of Ventura County, in which experts submitted reports on construction problems both to the builder and to the county and in
which, contrary to the inferences in the majority opinion, the
builder came highly recommended by another experienced
lender. There IS a potential risk of structural defects in any
construction, but it is impossible to find particular for(·seeability of construction harm merely from the act of a financial
inl!ltitution lending money to a builder.
3. The degree of certainty that tlte plaintiffs suffered
iniury. We can, for purposes of this discussion, concede that
plaintiffs suffered injury. The issue is whether liability for
that injury is to be imposcd on the nearest solvent bystander
or upon the party whose negligent conduct produced the
injury.
4. Oloselress of connection between injury suffered and
defendant's conduct. The lender here built no homes, drew no
plans and did 1I0t drive in a single nail. Its function was to
finance and not to construct. The experience of the institutional lender is in lending money, not in building homes. In
short, the two enterprises have no "closeness of connection";
they are significantly remote. There is no evidence that any
purchasers knew of thc existence of the defendant in its role as
lender of construction funds, much less that they relied uponany a.ctivity of the lender with regard to the development.
5. Moral blarne. Blamewortl1iness implies responsibility. The
lender's only responsibility here was to its shareholders and
depositors. If any moral blame is to be assessed, it must be by
tllem and not the plaintiff.
G. The policy of preventing future harm. Rules of law or
conduct intended to deter or minimize the risk of future harm
are imposed only upon those creating aud controlling the risk
of harm. The only manner in which this policy could apply to
lenders in the future-and this may be the ultimate result
of the majority opinion-is by compelling lenders to become
joint venturers wit.h entrepreneurs. This, as indicated heretoforE'. will result in n subshmtinl alteration in the previously
Ilccepted economic relntionship between lenders and entrepreneurial borrowers.
There appear to be adequate remedies both in law and in
E'quity for victims of negligent builders. But if home purchasers are not sufficiently protected today in their available
remedies for latent constructional defects, legislative bodies
can take appropriate action to revamp building codes, give
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more power to regulatory agencies, make licensing requircments more strict, compel bonding of home builders, providc
for iudustry-wide insurance. The answer does not lie in a
judicially created cause of action that will compel lending
institutions to assume a supervisory role in home construction.
Such a requirement will raise interest rates and the cost of
money and thus increase the cost of home construction. More
significantly, it will place supervisory responsibility on institutions which are limited by law to financing operations and
therefore ill-equipped with the skilled scientific, mechanical
and engineering personnel necessary to perform a supervisory
function effectively.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.
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BURKE, J.-I dissent. I agree with the Chief Justice that
despite the extensive activities of Great Western here the evidence, viewed most favorably to plaint.iffs, falls short of establishing the existence of a joint venture between Great Western and Conejo or Goldberg. However, I would hold 11 joint
venture relationship to be the only basis for imposing liability
upon Great Western. Its position vis-a-vis plaintiffs differs
materially from the relationships between plaintiffs and
defendants in the four cases upon which the majority opinion
relies. (MerriU v. Buck (1962) 58 Cal.2d 552, 561-562 [25
Cal.Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304] [defendant real estate agent
showed and rented to injured plaintiff lessee a house with
latent dangerous defect] ; Biakanja v. Irv·ing (1958) 49 Cal.
2d 647, 650 [320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358] [defendant
notary public drew invalid will, thereby depriving plajntiffs
of intended benefits thereunder); Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56'
Cal.2d 583, 588 [15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685] [attorney
charged with drafting will with invalid trust provisions, causing loss to intended beneficiaries] ; Stewart v. Cox (1961) 55
Cal.2d 857, 863 [13 Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345] [defendant
subcontractor installed defective and leaking concrete work
for swimming pool built for plaintiff] .)
In each of the cited cases defendant behaved negligently in
earrying out a duty of care undertaken by de! endant toward
another. But in the present case Great Western undertook no
duty toward Conejo, Goldberg. plaintiffs, or anyone else, any
violation of which resulted ill plaintiffs' losses. The majority
opinion speaks of a negligent failure by Great Western of
u a duty of care to its shareholders . . . to prevent the con·

